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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. nlcnlULLIN, 
Appellant and Plaintvff, 
vs. 
LYNvVOOD F. SHIMMIN and JACQUIE 
A. SHIMMIN, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8998 
On January 20, 1958, defendants executed an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase on the standard 
fonn approved by the Utah State Securities Commission 
and the Salt Lake Real Estate Board for the purchase 
of real property. Plaintiff accepted this offer by ~igning 
it that same day. 
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Plaintiff alleges that defendants breached the terms 
of this agreement in April, 1958, by not going forward 
with said purchase. Defendants deny any liability under 
the agreement for various reasons set forth in their 
answer. Defendants paid plaintiff the sum of $100.00 at 
the time the document referred to above was executed, 
and plaintiff has never returned or offered to return 
this money to defendants. On niay 21, 1958, plaintiff 
brought an action for specific performance of the afore-
said agreement and prayed in the alternative for damages 
for breach of contract in the event specific performance 
was not granted and for attorney's fees for enforce-
ment of the contract in either case. On August 15, 1958, 
plaintiff sold the property in question to Elmer and Elma 
Klitgaard. At a pre-trial hearing held on Kovember 7, 
1958, Judge A. H. Ellett disn1issed plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice for the reason that plaintiff did not re-
turn nor offer to return to defendant the earnest money 
deposit referred to above prior to the connnencement 
of this proceeding. On N ove1nber 1-!, 1958, plaintiff filed 
a motion to alter judg1nent. Plaintiff's motion was denied 
by the Honorable A. I-I. Ellett on Decmnber 1, 1958, 
on the grounds that plaintiff could not 111aintain an action 
for dmnages after selling the subject property to a third 
person after counnencing an action for specific per-
fornmnce or for dmuages in the alternative. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE AT THE 
PRE-TRIAL HELD ON NOVEMBER 7, 1958. 
POINT II 
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE AT THE 
PRE-TRIAL HELD ON NOVEMBER 7, 1958. 
The issue here is whether a seller nmst restore con-
sideration paid as a deposit on a contract to purchase 
real property in order to elect to enforce the contract 
upon buyer's breach by an action for specific perform-
ance or in the alternative for darnages. In the case of 
Andreason vs. Hansen, ____________ Utah ------------, 335 P (2d) 
404, it was held that the failure to return the deposit 
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4 
on an earnest 1noney agreement precluded a subsequent 
action for damages since the amount had thereby become 
liquidated at the election of the seller. No such election, 
however, could be claimed where the action commenced 
is one for specific performance. In the Andreason case, 
the successful buyers-appellants' brief stated as follows: 
"The cases clearly hold that where there is a provision 
for liquidated dainages in a contract for the sale of 
real property, the fact that such a provision exists does 
not eliminate the right of seller to require specific per-
fonnance of the contract rather than accept his other 
available rmnedy, that is liquidated damages." (P ±, 5). 
The pre-trial judge recognized this by stating at the 
conclusion of the proceedings of Decmnber 1, 1958, as 
follows: "I wasn't aware that the matter was for specific 
perfonnance, nor was I aware that the land had been 
sold on N ovmnber 7th. I had assu1ned it was an action 
for da1nages, and, of course, the Andreason case in my 
opinion would apply only to dalnages and not to specific 
perfonuance actions" (R 23). Therefore, there was not 
and could not be an election in this c~se at the time 
this snit was connnenced to retain the deposit as liqui-
datl'd and agreed damages rather than to enforce the 
agreen1en t. 
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POINT II 
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT. 
The first issue here is whether a seller who com-
mences an action for specific performance and in the 
alternative for damages is precluded fron1 obtaining the 
latter remedy when he sells the property between the 
time the action is commenced and the case tried. 
Rule 8 (a) provides that relief in the alternative or of 
several different types n1ay be demanded. Rule 8( e) (2) 
provides that a party may set forth as n1any separate 
claims as he has regardless of consistency and whether 
based on legal or on equitable grounds or both. In the 
case of Pverson vs. Dorff, 223 NvV 579, 198 Wise. 43 
(1929), the vendee brought an action to recover $500.00 
earnest money paid vendor pursuant to alleged breach 
of real estate contract. Vendor counter-clain1ed for 
specific performance and thereafter moved to amend his 
complaint by pleading a counter-claim for damages based 
on vendee's breach. The court there said: "It is equally 
clear that the remedy of specific performance and that 
prosecuted to recover damages are not inconsjstent 
remedies, because both are based upon the contraet. ... 
the mere commencement or pendency of one will not bar 
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the other or defeat the action." That case cited this 
language from Conwihan vs. Thompson, 111 l\{ass. 270: 
"'The remedy in equity by compelling specific perform-
ance and that at law in damages for breach are both in 
affirmance of the contract. They are alternative remedies 
but not inconsistent, and remedy in both forms might 
be sought in one and the same action." 
The Wisconsin case cited above concluded: "From 
the foregoing it conclusively appears that the equitable 
rernedy for specific performance and the legal remedy 
to recover damages are not inconsistent, especially where 
the action to recover damages is prosecuted after the 
abandonment of a plea for specific perforn1ance.'' 
Even if the remedies of specific perfonnance and 
damages are considered inconsistent, n1any courts have 
held that the commencen1ent of a suit is not a con-
clusive election and none occurs until plaintiff receives 
son1e benefit or defendant is caused some detriment 
thereby. 28 C.J.S. 1090 
~l,his court in the case of Salt Lake City L'S. Industrial 
CoJnmiss,ion, 17 P (2d) 239, cited the following language ,fJ 
of 9 R.C.L. 960 with approval: "An election of a remedy 
which has the effect of an estoppel in pais or an estoppel 
by reeord in that class of cases in which the rmnedies 
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are really inconsistent is generally considered rnade 
when an action has been commenced on one of such 
remedies. Some courts go so far as to say that in such 
cases the choice of rmnedy once made can not be with-
drawn or reconsidered though no advantage has been 
gained nor injury done by setting the choice aside. But 
the more reasonable rule is that the mere bringing of 
an action which has been dismissed before judgment, 
and in which no element of estoppel in pais has arisen, 
that is, where no advantage has been gained or no 
detriment has been occasioned, is not an election." 
18 Am. J ur. 155 states the rule as applied to the type 
of case in question as follows : "Parties to a contract 
have a right to stand on the agreement as entered into 
by them and may, in a proper case, invoke the aid of 
the court for its specific enforcernent, or at their option 
they may, upon breach of the contract, seek damages at 
law. When they resort to one of these remedies, such 
action may constitute an abandonment of the right to 
invoke the other. On this ground, an action for damages 
for breach of a contract has been held to bar a later suit 
for specific performance of the sarne contract, even 
though the first action was dismissed before judgment. 
On the other hand, the beginning of a suit for specific 
performance has been considered not such an election 
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of renwdies as would bar a later action for damages 
for breach of the contract, where the first proceeding 
was discontinued before any advantage accrued to the 
plaintiff or detriment resulted to the defendant." The 
case of M eM ahan v. M cM.ahan) 122 S.C. 336, 115 S.E. 
293, 26 A.L.R. 1295, an action for brealic of realty sale 
contract is cited as authority for that last statement of 
law. 
The crucial question is : If seller elects to enforce 
a contract by commencing an action for specific per-
formance, must he return any pay1nents n1ade by buyer 
prior to or immediately after he resells the subject 
property in order to pursue a re1nedy for dan1ages for 
breach of contract when the dmnages exceed the amount 
of such paJ!nents ~ 
As a practical 1natter it certainly would seem to 
be desirable to encourage sellers to resell their property 
after commencing an action for specific perfonnance 
rather than compel an unwilling purchaser to buy a 
house he does not want. Once the property has been 
resold and it is ascertained that the seller's loss caused 
by the buyPr's breach of contract is greater than the 
auwunt received by hiln on account of the purchase price, 
it would hardly seen1 reasonable to expect hiln to pay 
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such lesser amount to the buyer in order that he might. 
sue him for a larger amount. To do so would be so 
inconsistent with the normal pattern of conduct that it 
is not to be expected. 
If the principle of the Andreason case is extended 
to such a case as this where there was no overreaching, 
no vengeance, no deceptive nets, there is a grave danger 
that contracting parties will be deprived of the protection 
of their written agreements by overlooking a seemingly 
innocent provision there which appeared to be for their 
benefit by neglecting to return to the party at fault 
an insignificant amount and thereby falling into an un-
intended election of remedies, the result of which would 
be as grossly unfair as the judgment reversed in the 
Andreason case. It would appear to be a much more 
desirable rule to consider the question of election as one 
of fact rather than of law. Retention of the deposit is 
substantial evidence of election but it should not be in-
controvertible so as to make it a rule of law. 
Was not the holding in the Andreason case a result 
of the court's conscience being shocked that an attorney 
would and could obtain a judgment totalling $2,350.00 
when less than 24 hours elapsed between the time the 
contract there was executed and the breach occurred in 
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the absence of any evidence showing any Inaterial change 
in the market within that brief period of time~ Should 
not the rule in that case be limited to very similar facts 
rather than given universal application in a case such 
as this where more than four months elapsed between 
the time defendants signed the agreement and the time 
they indicated they would not go through with this sale~ 
Otherwise a just result in that case ·will probably result 
in unjustifiable protection to contract breakers in the 
future. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of dismissal of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County should be vacated and the cause re-
manded to the District Court to ascertain whether a 
valid agreement was entered into between plaintiff and 
defendants, and if so, whether the latter are liable for 
breach of the agreement, and if so, to enter judgment 
accordingly, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Very respectfully sub1nitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
and Plaint~ff 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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